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Gurdus: Protection Off of the Playing Field: Student Athletes Should be C

NOTE
PROTECTION OFF OF THE PLAYING FIELD:
STUDENT ATHLETES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES FOR PURPOSES OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
I. INTRODUCTION
College athletics are no longer concerned with just winning and

losing, but are now also concerned with making a profit. College
athletics has become very profitable,' and thus, a business relationship
has evolved between colleges and student athletes.2 Both television

contracts and ticket sales from college sporting events generate hundreds
of millions of dollars annually for universities.3 Many courts now even
consider university athletic programs to be products that are marketed by

the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA").4 Besides

making millions of dollars for their schools, student athletes are also

utilized as a means to increase student enrollment and enhance the
school's national reputation.!

1. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. 111-12 (1984) (recognizing that National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") television contracts have a commercial nature); see also
Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the NCAA, %,with its
multi-million dollar annual budget, is engaged in a business venture and is not entitled to a complete
exemption from anti-trust regulation on the ground that its activities are educational and carried on
for the benefit of amateurism); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (htD. Tenn. 1990)
(agreeing with the Hennessey decision that the NCAA is involved in a business venture).
"[I]ntercollegiate athletics in its management is clearly business, and big business at that."
Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1150.
2. See Barile v. Univ. of Va., 441 N.E.2d 608, 615 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
3. See NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (D. Nev. 1992); Bd. of Regents v. NCAA,
546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Rick Telander, Something Must Be Done, SmCTS
ILLusTRATED, Oct. 2, 1989, at 92, 95.
4. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02; Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 14v".
5. For example, Patrick Ewing, after joining the basketball team at Georgetown University,
not only generated more than three million dollars for the school annually, but applications for
admission increased thirty-three percent. See Sean Alan Roberts, Comment College Athletes,
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However, the student athletes that work to achieve each school's
success on the playing field are rarely protected if injured while playing
their sport. Athletes are often discarded after they have been seriously
injured.' As a result, many college scholarship athletes have turned to
workers' compensation statutes in an attempt to receive the protection
they deserve for the costs of their injuries

Part II of this Note provides a general background of workers'
compensation, including the various tests courts use in determining an

employer-employee relationship between universities and student
athletes. Part III discusses the major cases that either support or oppose
the applicability of workers' compensation statutes to college athletes.

Finally, Part IV discusses why courts should hold that scholarship
athletes are employees of their colleges and universities and should be
able to receive workers' compensation.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

The purpose of workers' compensation legislation is to place the
cost of workers' injuries on the consumer through the price of products
or services.' As stated by one court:
[A]ny worker whose services form a regular and continuing part of the
cost of that product [or service], and whose method of operation is not

such an independent business that it forms in itself a separate route
through which his own cost of ... accidents can be channeled, is

within the presumptive area of intended protection.

Universities, and Workers' Compensation: Placing the Relationship in the Proper Context by
Recognizing Scholarship Athletes as Employees, 37 S. TaX. L. REV. 1315, 1316 n.8 (1996).

6. For example, examine the situation of Kent Waldrep, a former Texas Christian University
football player, who suffered a serious injury on the playing field, leaving him paralyzed. See id. at
1338-39; Juan B. Elizondo Jr., Paralyzed Football Player Sues for Worker's Compensation
Benefits, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 15, 1997, available at 1997 WL 4888295. Even though he has

incurred more than $500,000 in medical costs alone, the university has only contributed about
$10,000. See Manny Topol, Payback Time, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Aug. 8, 1993, at 10.

7. See Graczyk v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 229 Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 (Ct. App. 1986);
Cheatham v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 49 Cal. Comp. Cases 54,55 (Ct. App. 1984); Van Hoin
v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State Comp. Ins. Fund v.
Indus. Comm'n, 314 P.2d 288, 289 (Colo. 1957); Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 426
(Colo. 1953); Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1171 (Ind. 1983); Coleman
v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
8. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399,406 (Cal. 1989);
Evans v. Naihaus, 326 So. 2d 601, 604 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Kertesz v. Korsh, 686 A.2d 368, 370
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
9. Oilfield Safety & Mach. Specialties, Inc. v. Harman Unlimited, Inc., 625 F.2d 1248, 1253
(5th Cir. 1980) (quoting 1C ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 43.51 (1980)).
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Each employer is obligated to pay for its employees' injuries while on
the job by either arranging for insurance or paying premiums to the state

workers' compensation fund.'0 In return, the employer is protected from
excessive damage awards resulting from tort litigation and the injured

employee is guaranteed prompt, limited compensation."
There are two basic inquiries that must be made to entitle an
individual to workers' compensation. First, the agreement between the
employer and the individual must be analyzed in order to determine ifan
employer-employee relationship existed at the time of the injury."
However, most workers' compensation statutes do not contain a specific
definition

of

the

term

"employee."' 3

Therefore,

"'the

term

"employee"... has probably produced more reported cases than any
definition of status in the modem history of law."'

4

Second, if an employer-employee relationship exists, it must then
be decided whether the injury occurred as a result of, or in connection

with, the employment.'5 In this Note, this second inquiry is not
addressed. Rather, the purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that student
athletes have an employer-employee relationship with their universities

under workers' compensation laws. Therefore, this Note examines the
various tests that courts use in determining whether this relationship
exists.
A.

The Control Test

The control test, the traditional test used in questions of
employment, focuses on whether the employer has a right to control the
employee.

6

"'The test to be used in determining the relationship of

10. See Mark R. Whitmore, Note, Denying ScholarshipAthletes Wo,er's Comptensation: Do
Courts Punt Away a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA L. REV. 763. 769-70 (1991) (construing 4 ArmUR
LARSON, LARsON'S WORKERS' CO.MPENSATION LAW § 1.01. at 1-3 (1990)).
11. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc., 769 P.2d at 406; Kidder v. Miller-Davis Co., 564 NA112d
872,878 (Mich. 1997).
12. See Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1172; Wells v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 364 N.V.2d 670,
672 (Mich. 1984); Griffin v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 466 N.\V.2d 148. 149 (N.D. 1991).
13. See Kidder, 564 N.W.2d at 875.
14. Munson v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 721 A.2d 623. 623 (D.C. 1998) (quoting 3
ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'COMPENSATION LAW § 43.10. at 8-1 (1993)) (alteration in
original).
15. See Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 426 (Colo. 1953); David W. Vokdbum,
Comment, College Athletes Should Be Entitled to Workers' Conmpc.'ation for Sqrts.Relatcd
Injuries: A Request to Broaden the Definition of Etployee Under Ohio Reised Cede Section
4123.01,28 AKRON L. REV. 611, 617 (1994).
16. See Edwards v. Caulfield, 560 So. 2d 364, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ('Control has
always been the critical test for determining whether one is an employee or an indzpersdnt
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[employee to employer] is whether [the employer] had a reserved right
of control over the means and agencies by which the work was done or
the result produced, not the actual exercise of such control.""' 7 In other
words, for the purposes of this Note, the question is whether universities
have a right to control their student athletes.
The control test basically uses the same criteria as the "masterservant" analysis under the Restatement (Second) of Agency.'8 "[T]he
four principal factors under the control test, are (1) direct evidence of
right or exercise of control; (2) method of payment; (3) the furnishing of
equipment; and (4) the right to fire."' 9 In addition, when applying the
control test, each of the factors present must be balanced to determine
their relative weight and importance; none of the factors are
controlling. 2°
B. The "Relative Nature of the Work" Test
The "relative nature of the work" test is usually referred to by
courts to either supplement2 ' or replacer the control test. The "relative

contractor for workers' compensation purposes ....
");
Abramson v. Long Beach Mem'l Hosp., 478
N.Y.S.2d 105, 106-07 (App. Div. 1984) (holding that a hospital dictating an employee's wardrobe
and regulating her movements while working was sufficient to show right to control); Owens v.
Turner, 362 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tenn. 1962) (holding that a right to terminate employment evidences
right to control). The majority of states currently rely on the control test in deciding whether an
employer-employee relationship exists. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 1322 n.45.
17. Exparte Stewart, 518 So. 2d 118, 119 (Ala. 1987) (quoting Am. Tennis Courts, Inc. v.
Hinton, 378 So. 2d 235, 237 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979)) (alterations in original).
18. See id. at 119; Lowe v. Zarghami, 731 A.2d 14, 19 (N.J. 1999); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
19. Shelby v. Peavey Elecs. Corp., 724 So. 2d 504, 507 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998); see also Kiele
v. Steve Henderson Logging, 905 P.2d 82, 84 (Idaho 1995); Wangen v. City of Fountain, 255
N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. 1977) (applying almost identical factors when looking for the existence of
an employment relationship); St. John's Lutheran Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271,
1275 (Mont. 1992) (discussing the same four factors under the control test); Lowe, 731 A.2d at 1920 (stating similar factors for its control test); Comm'rs of the State Ins. Fund v. Lindenhurst Green
& White Corp., 475 N.Y.S.2d 42,43 (App. Div. 1984).
20. See Kiele, 905 P.2d at 84. However, many courts recognize that the most important factor
is evidence of the right to control the details of the work. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of
Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399,404 (Cal. 1989); Wangen, 255 N.W.2d at 815.
21. See Griffin v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 466 N.W.2d 148, 150 (N.D. 1991) (stating
that the "'relative-nature-of-the-work' test can be used "'as an additional aid in judging worker
status, particularly when.' the control "'test is not clearly determinative'); Lowe, 731 A.2d at 21
(stating that "[t]he relative nature of the work test supplements the control test in limited
circumstances").
22. See Pollack v. Pino's Formal Wear & Tailoring, 601 A.2d 1190, 1196 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992) (stating that "the [New Jersey] courts have placed greater reliance upon the relative
nature of the work test"). Furthermore, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, believes
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nature of the work" test determines whether a worker is an employee by

assessing whether a worker's tasks constitute an integral part of the
employer's regular business.' In other words, "whether the [worker's]
services were substantial, essential and recurring."'
With respect to the character of the work performed, the claimant
would be required to show: (1) the degree of skill involved; (2) the
degree to which the work is a separate calling or business; and (3) the
extent to which a worker so situated reasonably can be expected to
carry the burden of accident. With respect to the relationship of the
work to the putative employer's business, the claimant would have to
establish: (1) the extent to which the work is a regular part of the
putative employer's regular business; (2) the extent to which the work
is being performed continuously or intermittently; and (3) the extent to
which the work is of sufficient duration to constitute continuing
services rather than a particular assignmentea
The "relative nature of the work" test is of particular value if the
working relationship involves professional services such that the
employer cannot exercise control over the methods used to provide those
services.'

C. The "Economic Reality" Test
A third, but less utilized test is the "economic reality" test, which
appears to be a combination of both the control and the "relative nature
of the work" tests. Under the "economic reality" test, there are certain

that this test is more realistic to the objects and purposes of workers' compensation. See Kertesz v.
Korsh, 686 A.2d 368, 372 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
23. See Hanson v. Transp. Gen., Inc., 716 A.2d 857, 861 (Conn. 1998); Evans v. Naihaus, 326
So. 2d 601, 604 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Kertesz, 686 A.2d at 372. Other courts state the "relative
nature of the work" test in terms of looking at two distinct areas: (1) the nature of the claimant's
work and (2) the relation of that work to the alleged employer's regular business. See Oilfield Safety
& Mach. Specialties, Inc. v. Harman Unlimited, Inc., 625 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1980).
However, both focus on the same factors.
24. Evans, 326 So. 2d at 604.
25. Hanson, 716 A.2d at 861-62; see also Santos v. Standard Havens, Inc., 541 A.2d 703,711
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (analyzing the character of work. level of skill, degree of
independence, and whether the individual deals with his or her own injury to determine %%hetherthe
claimant was an employee); Griffn, 466 N.W.2d at 150 (stating these same elements as they are
described in IC ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 43.52, at 8-25(1990)).
26. See Lowe, 731 A.2d at 21 (stating that "[t]he relative nature of the work test allows the
[c]ourt to account for that 'necessary exercise of independent judgment"'). For example, practicing
physicians are expected to exercise independent, professional judgment while treating patients and
educating medical students. See id.
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factors that the court must consider in deciding whether an employeremployee relationship existed.27
These factors include: (1) the proposed employer's right to control or
dictate the activities of the proposed employee; (2) the proposed
employer's right to discipline or fire the proposed employee; (3) the
payment of "wages"... ; and (4) whether the task performed ... was

"an integral part" of the proposed employer's business. 2

No one factor is controlling, and all of them must be taken into account
in determining the existence of an employment relationship.29
In applying the "economic reality" test, courts also examine the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the work performed." The test
was adopted "as a more realistic attempt to define the employeremployee relationship through a 'balancing of all the relevant factors in
each case."''3
III.

MAJOR CASE LAW-THE STUDENT ATHLETE, THE UNIVERSITY,
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. In Support of the Student Athlete as an Employee

In University of Denver v. Nemeth,32 a football player sustained
injuries while practicing for the University of Denver.33 At the time of
the accident, he was receiving fifty dollars a month and free housing
from the university in exchange for working on the school's campus.'
However, these jobs were contingent upon his participation on the
football team.3"
Nemeth brought a workers' compensation claim for his injuries.
The court held that an employer-employee relationship existed because
27. See Coleman v.W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
28. Id. at 225-26; see also Seaton-SSK Eng'g, Inc. v. Forbes, 639 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994); Clark v. United Techs. Auto., Inc., 594 N.W.2d 447,451 (Mich. 1999).
29. See Clark, 594 N.W.2d at 451; Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 226.
30. See Seaton-SSK Eng'g, Inc., 639 N.E.2d at 1050; Clark, 594 N.W.2d at 451; Wells v.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 364 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Mich. 1984).
31. Kidder v. Miller-Davis Co., 564 N.W.2d 872, 877 (Mich. 1997) (quoting Renfroc v.
Higgins Rack Coating & Mfg. Co., 169 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)). The Kidder court
went on to state: "Given the increasingly complicated relationships developing in today's business
and economic marketplaces anything other than a totality of the circumstances test would be an
insufficient guide by which to evaluate the employee-employer relationship." Id.
32. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
33. See id. at 424.
34. See id.

35. See id. at 427.
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his performance on the football field directly affected his
compensation. 6 If Nemeth had failed to produce on the field, then his
compensation would have ceased. 7 The court also noted that "[h]igher
education ... is a business, and a big one.... A student employed by
the University to discharge certain duties, not a part of his education
program, is no different than the employee who is taking no course of
instruction so far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned."
Ten years later, in Van Horn v IndustrialAccident Commission,"
the wife of a member of the California State Polytechnic football team
successfully brought a workers' compensation claim to recover for the
death of her husband, who died in a plane crash while returning from a
game.'0 The decedent received an annual one hundred and fifty dollar
"'athletic scholarship.""'4 The court rejected the commission's
contentions that allowing students with athletic scholarships to receive
compensation benefits would impose a heavy burden on the schools,
would discourage the' 2granting of scholarships, and therefore, would be
against public policy.
Instead, the court held that there was a contract of employment
between the decedent and his coach.43 In holding for the decedent's wife,
the court compared student athletes to other students who have been held
to be employees, such as student nurses and student teachers." "[O]ne
may have the dual capacity of student and employee in respect to an
activity."'5 The court also noted that "direct compensation in the form of
wages is not necessary to establish the relationship so long as the service
is not gratuitous."
B. Against the Student Athlete as an Employee
In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission,
a student athlete was the recipient of a "grant-in-aid" scholarship and
36. See id at 426.
37. See U

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

I at 425-26.
33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Dist. CL App. 1963).
Seeid at 170.
See id. at 171.
See id. at 174.
See id at 172-73.
See id. at 173.

45. Id "The fact that academic credit is given for participation in the activity is immaterial.
Id

46. I at 172. "The form of remuneration is immaterial" Id. at 174.
47. 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
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was employed part-time by the school.48 On the opening play of a school
football game, he sustained a head injury resulting in his death.49 The
court, in denying the claim for workers' compensation, reasoned that it
was significant that the college received no direct benefit from football,
since it was not in the football business. It also distinguished the
holding of Nemeth by finding that Nemeth's employment "depended
wholly on his playing football, and it is clear that if he failed to perform
as a football player he would lose the job provided for him by the
University."5"
More recently, in Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of
Trustees, 2 a scholarship athlete was rendered 95-100% disabled from a
football injury.53 The Indiana Supreme Court, reversing a lower court's
ruling, held that the parties had no intent to enter into an employeeemployer relationship when they made the agreement, and that the
financial aid the athlete received did not constitute pay or income to
allow him to qualify as an employee.5 The court also focused upon the
NCAA's policies concerning the protection of a student athlete's
amateur status. 6
1 the
Finally, in Coleman v. Western Michigan University,"
university reduced a football player's renewable scholarship following
an injury. The court applied the "economic reality" test, under which it
found that the university did possess some control over Coleman, but
maintained that this control was not dependent upon his scholarship. 9
Instead, it applied to all student athletes6 The court also concluded that
Coleman's activities, as a football player, were not an integral part of the
school's business.6'
48. See id. at 289.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 290.
51. Id.
52. 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
53. Seeid. at 1172.
54. See id. at 1173.
55. See id. For evidence that Rensing's financial aid did not constitute pay or income, the
court looked at the fact that he did not report his scholarship for income tax purposes. See id.
56. See id.
57. 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
58. See id. at 225.
59. See id. at 225-26. The court stated that "[p]laintiff's scholarship did not subject him to any
extraordinary degree of control over his academic activities." Id. at 226.
60. See id.
61. See id. The court stated "that defendant's academic program could operate effectively
even in the absence of the intercollegiate football program." Md at 227. The court did, however, find
that Coleman's "scholarship constituted 'wages."' Id. at 226. Wages are defined "as items of
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In addition to the foregoing cases, there are two more recent
California cases that hold that student athletes are not employees of their
universities.62 In Graczyk v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,0 a
scholarship athlete sustained injuries to his head, neck, and spine while
playing college football.6' The court applied California's Labor Code
section 3352(k), which provides in pertinent part:
'Employee' excludes ...[any student participating as an athlete in
amateur sporting events sponsored by any public agency, public or
private nonprofit college, university or school, who receives no
remuneration for such participation other than the use of athletic
equipment, uniforms, transportation, travel, meals, lodgings,
scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other expenses incidental thereto"
The court commented that "the state has a significant, if not a
compelling interest in defining the employer-employee status.""&
Cheatham v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Boar6 7 also applied
section 3352(k) in a case involving a college scholarship wrestler who
was injured during a wrestling team scrimmage.3 However, unlike
Graczyk, the Cheatham court included reasons for its decision beyond
the statute. The court reasoned that the university is really the one
"'rendering service"' to the student, and it is not the other way around."'
In addition, the court also stated that it was unable to distinguish
between an athletic scholarship and an academic scholarship.7a
However, the court in Cheatham did recognize that athletics are an
integral part of universities. 7 ' It also distinguished Cheatham from the

compensation which are measurable in money or which confer an economic gain upon the
employee." l (construing Morgan v. Win Schuler's Rest., 234 N.W.2d 885. 888-89 Mich. Ct.
App. 1975)).
62. See Graczyk v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 229 Cal. Rptr. 494. 496 (Ct. App. 1986;:
Cheatham v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 49 Cal. Comp. Cases 54 (1984).

63. 229 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1986).
64. See id.
at 496.
65. Id. at 499-500 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(k) (Vest 1981)) (alterations inonginal).
The legislature amended the code in 1981 to include the terms "scholarships" and -grants-in-aid" in
order to expand the existing exclusion concerning athletes. See id. Hawaii is the only other state to

expressly exclude scholarship athletes from receiving benefits under its workers' compensation
statutes. See Roberts, supranote 5. at 1327 n.72.
66. Gracyzk, 229 Cal. Rptr.at 502.
67. 49 Cal. Comp. Cases 54 (1984).

68. See i at 55.
69. See i at 58. The university provides the student with a "full panoply of educational
resources for the student's use." I&

70. See idL
at 59.
71. See id.
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case of Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Commission.72 Agreeing with
the decision in Van Horn, the court stated that a "school's payment of
consideration to the student-athlete brings the school measurable and
tangible benefits, including money, sufficient to establish an employeremployee relationship."73 However, in Cheatham, the court found that
"the absence of any fair inference of economic benefit to" the university
from its wrestling program distinguished it from Van Horn.
IV.

STUDENT ATHLETES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
EMPLOYEES OF UNIVERSITIES

A.

An Analysis of the Case Law

An analysis of the relevant case law reveals that many of the
decisions holding that student athletes are not employees languish from
poor reasoning. In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial
Commission," the court reasoned that a student athlete was not an
employee because the university did not receive a direct benefit from the
athlete. 76 Furthermore, in Coleman v. Western Michigan University," the
court justified its decision by concluding that college athletics were not
an integral part of the school's business. 7' These conclusions appear
unsubstantiated and unreasonable or perhaps they have just become
outdated.
Universities currently earn hundreds of millions of dollars annually
from college athletics.79 This has led many courts to consider college
sports as a form of substantial business for universities and the NCAA.80
To allege that college athletics are not an integral part of a school's
business, or that the school does not to receive a direct benefit from the
athletics, is absurd.

72. Seeid.at6l.

73. Id.
74. Id. The court stated that it will not "assume that a 'minor' sport, such as wrestling
produces tangible economic benefits analogous to the benefits received from a major, revenueproducing sport such as football." Id.
75. 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
76. See id. at 290.
77. 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
78. See id. at 227.
79. See NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (D. Nev. 1992); Bd. of Regents v. NCAA,
546 F. Supp. 1276, 1289-92 (w.D. Okla. 1982); Telander, supranote 3, at 95.
80. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1977); Gaines v. NCAA, 746
F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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In addition, the more recent case of Cheatham v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board,8' although holding against the student
athlete, stated that "the student-athlete brings the school measurable and
tangible benefits, including money, sufficient to establish an employeremployee relationship."' The court in Cheatham also concluded that
"[o]ur oldest colleges and universities have for many decades included
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of their program of
instruction. ' Therefore, a student athlete of a major, revenue-producing
college sport, such as football, should be considered an employee of his
or her school.
Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustee illustrates
another poor analysis. The court blindly reasoned that a student athlete
did not receive any payment for playing football in order to qualify him
as an employee, even though his financial aid was contingent upon his
participation in the sport.s Several courts have established that a
contractual relationship exists between student athletes and universities
in which there is a "pay-for-play" relationship."' Moreover, in Coleman
v. Western Michigan University,7 the court held that a scholarship
constituted wages.'s In return for his athletic services, a student athlete
"receive[s] certain items of compensation which are measurable in
money, including room and board, tuition and books."' "However,
direct compensation in the form of wages is not necessary to establish
the [employment] relationship so long as the service is not gratuitous."",
In addition to poor reasoning, several of the courts' decisions
resulted from either reversing the decision of a lower court or a decision

81. 49 Cal. Comp. Cases 54 (1984).
82. Id. at 61.

83. Il at 59.
84. 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
85. Seeid. at 1174.

86. See Begley v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 367 F. Supp. 908, 910 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (stating
that under an athletic scholarship agreement the university provides the student athlete with

monetary aid for the completion of an undergraduate degree in exchange for participation in its
athletic program); Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379. 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972)

(excusing the university's obligation to provide financial assistance under the contractual agreearnt
because of the student athlete's refusal to participate in its athletic program).
87. 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
88. See idj at 226. The lower court in Rensing v. Indiana State UniversityBeard of Trustees.
437 N.E.2d 78 (Ind.Ct. App. 1982), also stated "that scholarships or similar benefits may b vievd

as piy." Id. at 85.
89.

Coleman, 336 NAV.2d at 226.

90. Van Horn v.Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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of a workers' compensation commission.9" A decision that is reasonably
based upon the evidence should be sustained.' In Rensing, the Indiana
Supreme Court reversed the decision of its court of appeals,9" which held
that a student athlete was an employee and entitled to workers'
compensation.' The Indiana Court of Appeals reached its decision by
finding that "athletes generally play a beneficial role in creating the
desired educational environment at the University."" The court
concluded that the football team "must properly be viewed as an aspect
of the University's overall occupation.""
Likewise, in State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial
Commission,9 the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado, which awarded death
benefits to the decedent's wife.98 The Commission based its decision on
the fact that the deceased left his job to return to college because the
school offered him a job at the college in exchange for playing football."
The employment at the school was dependent on his participation in the
athletic program."
In addition to higher courts sustaining the original decisions made
in the lower courts and commissions, courts will reach better results if
they adhere to the proposition that workers' "compensation law should
be liberally construed to effect the law's beneficent purposes.'... "[I]n
applying the statutory definition of 'employee' to particular fact
situations, a measure of liberality should be indulged in ...to the end
that in doubtful cases an injured workman or his dependents will not be
deprived of the benefits of the humane provisions of our workmen's
compensation law[s]. ''I °2 Therefore, if a court is unsure as to whether a
student athlete meets the statutory definition of employee, it should not
deny him or her the benefits of the law.
91. See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm'n, 314 P.2d 288, 289 (Colo. 1957); Rensing v.
Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1171 (Ind. 1983).
92. See Van Horn, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
93. See Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1171.
94. See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 437 N.E.2d 78, 89 (Ind.Ct. App. 1982).
95. Id. This was evidenced by increased enrollments as the university prospered athletically.
See id.

96. IdM
97. 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
98. See id. at 289.
99. See id. at 290.
100. See id.
101. Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). See
also Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423,426 (Colo. 1953); Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ind. 1983); Rensing, 437 N.E.2d at 84.
102. Rensing, 437 N.E.2d at 84.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss3/4

12

Gurdus: Protection Off of the Playing Field: Student Athletes Should be C
2001]

PROTECTION OFF OF THE PLAYING FIELD

Finally, many of the cases fail to clearly apply any of the three tests
used to determine whether an employment relationship exists for

purposes of workers' compensation." 3 These tests should be employed to
aid courts in reaching their decisions. Under any of the three tests, a
court could reasonably find a student athlete to be an employee of his or
her university.
B. The Application of the Tests
The control test encompasses four principal factors, which "are (1)
direct evidence of right or exercise of control; (2) method of payment;
(3) the furnishing of equipment; and (4) the right to fire."'"' The coaches
and athletic departments of each university control, or have the right of

control over, their athletes."'s Consequently, due to this control, the daily
lives of student athletes are highly regulated.""s They must attend

practices, games, and film sessions." These obligations can occupy
several hours on an average day. In addition, their academic
responsibilities are restrained by the demands of their athletic

responsibilities.'

Due to athletic scheduling, athletes are constantly

forced to miss classes, and also have limited access to the library and
other educational aids. t0
The second element of the control test is whether, and how, the

university compensates the student athlete. A student athlete who
receives a scholarship is clearly compensated by his school for his
participation in athletics. As previously stated, several courts have

established that a contractual relationship exists between student athletes
and universities, in which there is a "pay-for-play" relationship.tt"
103. See Van Horn, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 174 (using public policy to determine if a student athlete
constituted an employee); State Comp. Ins. Fund, 314 P.2d at 290 (reasoning that the college
received no direct benefit from football); Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 426 (recognizing that the student
athlete's performance on the field directly affected his compensation); Rensing. 444 N.E.2d at 1173
(holding "that there was no intent to enter into an employee-employer relationship").
104. Shelby v. Peavey Elecs. Corp., 724 So. 2d 504,507 (Miss. CL App. 1998).
105. See Carl Redman, Chambers: Make Athletes Semi-Pros, BATON ROuGE STATE TImES,
May 9,1985, at3F, available at 1985 WL 4077018; see also Whitmore,supranote 10,at790.
106. According to former Nebraska State Senator Ernest Chambers, "[flooball is a job' ...
'The athletes have regular hours, regular duties and they can be fired.-' Redman, supra note 105,
available at 1985 WL 4077018; see also Wlhitmore, supra note 10,at 790.
107. See Whitmore, supra note 10, at 790.
108. SeeMl
109. See i. at 791.
110. See Begley v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 367 F. Supp. 908. 910 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (stating
that under an athletic scholarship agreement the university provides the student athlete with
monetary aid for the completion of an undergraduate degree in exchange for participation in its
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Moreover, it has also been held that a scholarship constitutes wages."' In
return for his or her athletic services, a student athlete "receive[s] certain
items of compensation which are measurable in money, including room
and board, tuition and books."' 2 In other words, they are "paid in the
most meaningful way possible: with a free education.""' Additionally,
"direct compensation in the form of wages is not necessary to establish
the [employment] relationship so long as the service is not gratuitous."''
Next, the control test looks at who furnishes the equipment. While
the athletes provide the athletic talent, the universities provide the
equipment, including athletic apparel, footwear, and facilities used for
practice and competition." 5 Finally, the test also analyzes the
university's right to fire the student athlete. The university has the right
to terminate its relationship with a student athlete by discontinuing the
scholarship agreement." 6 "Refusal to renew a scholarship agreement
amounts to termination because it leaves the athlete with no place to
play and without the benefits of the scholarship agreement.""'
Just as student athletes satisfy the elements of the control test, they
also fulfill the "relative nature of the work" test. The "relative nature of
the work" test concentrates on whether the student athlete's tasks
constitute an integral part of the university's regular business."' Courts
look at (1) the nature of the student athlete's work and (2) the relation of
that work to the university's regular business." 9 Universities receive
athletic program); Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972)
(excusing the university's obligation to provide financial assistance under the contractual agreement
because of the student athlete's refusal to participate in its athletic program).
111. See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 437 N.E.2d 78, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982);
Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224,226 (Mich. CL App. 1983).
112. Coleman, 336 N.V.2d at 226.
113. KNIGHT FOUNDATION, COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, KEEPING FAITH
WITH THE STUDENT-ATHLETE: A NEW MODEL FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 11 (1991)
[hereinafter KNIGHT REPORT].

114. Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see
also Betts v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 271 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Mich. 1978) (awarding workers'
compensation to a student teacher who only received training and class credit for teaching); Krause
v. Trs. of Hamline Univ., 68 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Minn. 1955) (holding that a student nurse receiving
free room and board is an employee for workers' compensation purposes).
115. See Whitmore, supra note 10, at 794 (construing NCAA, NCAA MANUAL 173 (1991)).
116. See Rensing, 437 N.E.2d at 85 (stating that the right to terminate exists under certain
prescribed conditions).
117. Whitmore, supra note 10, at 791.
118. See Hanson v. Transp. Gen., Inc., 716 A.2d 857, 861 (Conn. 1998); Evans v. Naihaus, 326
So. 2d 601, 604 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Kertesz v. Korsh, 686 A.2d 368, 372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996).
119. See Oilfield Safety & Mach. Specialties, Inc. v. Harman Unlimited, Inc., 625 F.2d 1248,
1253 (5th Cir. 1980).
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millions of dollars annually from their athletic programs,' as well as an
increase in student enrollment and visibility, resulting in a more
prominent national reputation.' Successful athletic "programs appear to
promise a quick route to revenue, recognition and renown for the
university.""2
Aside from being a regular part of the university's business, a
student athlete's work also continues year round. "To participate at a
level of top physical performance and to satisfy their scholarships,
athletes must practice and stay healthy throughout the year, or risk
deterioration of their skills to a level unacceptable to their coaches. ' 3
Athletes may be reminded that the university can choose not to renew an
athletic scholarship. 24
Besides having a significant relationship to the university's
business, the services of student athletes resemble the type of work
performed by employees. Student athletes are given scholarships based
on their abilities to perform in their sport, just as any other employee is
paid to perform in his or her line of work.P Additionally, the financial
burden that is imposed on a student athlete, if an accident should incur,
is almost impossible for most student athletes to handle.1:s
The third, and final, test is the "economic reality" test, which
consists of four factors. The first three, the right to control, the right to
fire, and the payment of wages,"z have all been covered previously in the
discussion of the control test."a The last factor, whether the task
performed was an integral part of the university's business,' z was

120. See NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (D. Nev. 1992); Bd. of Regents v. NCAA.

546 F. Supp. 1276, 1289-92 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Telander, supra note 3. at 95.
121. For example, Patrick Ewing, after joining the basketball team at Georgetown University,
not only generated more than three million dollars for the school annually, but applications for
admission increased thirty-three percent. See Roberts, supranote 5, at 1316 n.8.
122. KNIGH-TREPoRT, supranote 113, at5.
123. Whitmore, supranote 10, at 795. In order to be a successful player an athlete may have to
spend most of his summer working out. See Telander, supranote 3. at 97.
124. See Whitmore, supranote 10, at 791.

125. See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
126. For example, "Kent Waldrep, a former Texas Christian University football player,"
incurred more than $500,000 in medical costs alone after suffering a serious injury. See Robzrts,
supranote 5, at 1338-39; Topol, supranote 6.
127. See Seaton-SSK Eng'g, Inc. v. Forbes, 639 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ind. CL App. 1994); Clark

v. United Techs. Auto., Inc., 594 NAV.2d 447,451 (Mich. 1999); Coleman v. V. Mich. Univ., 336
N.W.2d 224,225-26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
128.

See supranotes 104-17 and accompanying text.

129. See Seaton-SSK Eng'g, Inc., 639 N.E.2d at 1050; Clark, 594 N.W.2d at 451; Co!enan,
336 N.W.2d at 225-26.
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discussed under the "relative nature of the work" test. 3° Like the other

two tests, an analysis pursuant to the "economic reality" test also
concludes that student athletes are employees of their universities.
C. Analogous Case Law
Outside the scope of workers' compensation law, student athletes

have previously been classified as employees of their universities.
"Alabama grand juries called college athletes 'employees' and the

schools their 'employers'
agents ... .-

in indictments returned against sports

In particular, "[t]he grand juries alleged that the agents

'did confer or offer to confer a benefit upon an employee [student
athlete] without the consent of the ... employer [university]." '
Similarly, in United States v. Walters,' the court applied the mail fraud
statute, designating the student athlete as an employee and his school as
an employer."

Many other students have also been held to be employees for
workers' compensation purposes, including, in particular, student
nurses, 35 student medical interns,' 36 and student teachers.' a3 Courts look
at practically the same factors when resolving these student cases.
Furthermore, many of the everyday lives of these students do not differ
greatly with those of student athletes.
First, there is not much variance within the control issue. Student
nurses are given set schedules and are "entirely subject to the control and
supervision of the head nurse.' 3 In addition, "[g]eneral control over the
student nurses, such as reassignment ... and satisfying itself that

130. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
131. Chris Mortensen, NCAA Athletes Called 'Employees' in Alabama Indictments of Agents,
ATLANTA J., Feb. 4, 1988, at A01, availableat 1988 WL 5949244.
132. Id (third alteration in original).
133. 775 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. fI1. 1991).
134. See id. at 1178.
135. See In re Brewer's Case, 141 N.E.2d 281, 282 (Mass. 1957); Krause v. Trs. of Hamline
Univ., 68 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Minn. 1955); Walls v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., 568 So. 2d 712, 713 (Miss,
1990); Heget v. Christ Hosp., 58 A.2d 615, 615-16 (N.J. Ct. C.P. 1948). "It is well settled that
student nurses who perform services and are furnished board and room are employees within the
meaning of the [workers' compensation] act." Krause, 68 N.W.2d at 126; see also Brewer's Case,
141 N.E.2d at 282 (stating that it has been uniformly held that a student nurse is an employee).
136. See Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hosp., 140 N.E. 694, 694 (N.Y. 1923); Croston v. Monteflore
Hosp., 645 N.Y.S.2d 471, 471 (App. Div. 1996); Olsson v. Nyack Hosp., 598 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349
(App. Div. 1993); Ryles v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 420 S.E.2d 487,488 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
137. See Sch. Dist. No. 60 v. Indus. Comm'n, 601 P.2d 651, 661 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Betts
v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 271 N.W.2d 498,498 (Mich. 1978).
138. Heget, 58 A.2d at 616.
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compliance with the curriculum was attained, [is] maintained by the
university."'39 Similar control also exists in the case of student medical
interns.' As for student athletes, the same type of control and
supervision are imposed upon them by their coaches and universities.''

Furthermore, the right of termination exists against all of these
students at any time. Specifically, student medical interns can "be
dismissed at any time for failure to follow protocol or other
unsatisfactory work."'4' Likewise, the scholarships of student athletes
can be terminated under several conditions, including a failure to meet
in a manner which would render
academic requirements and behaving
43
competition.'
for
oneself ineligible
Finally, and most analogous to student athletes, there is the issue of
the payment of wages. Just as with student athletes, "'[t]he element of
payment ...need not be in money, but may be in anything of value.

Board, room, and training, such as might be furnished [to] a student
nurse or hospital intern ... or student teacher are treated as the
equivalent of wages.""" In Croston v. Montefiore Hospital,"" the court

ruled that "although there was no financial remuneration for plaintiff's
services, it has been held that the training and experience attained at the
hospital, which is necessary for eventual technologist certification, is a
thing of value and, therefore, equivalent to wages.""' This scenario is
similar to that of the student athlete. Most student athletes need the
coaching and experience available to them in college to have any chance
of achieving a professional career in sports.
In Heget v. Christ Hospital,4 the court held that in return for the
plaintiff's services as a student nurse, "she received instruction, training,
food and lodging and incidental equipment. This constituted her
139.

Krause, 68 N.W.2d at 126.

140. See Croston, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 472; Olsson, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
141. See supranotes 105-09 and accompanying text.
142.

Croston, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 472.

143. See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 437 N.F.2d 78,85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
568 So. 2d 712, 717 (Miss. 1990) (quoting IC ArTHUR
144. Walls v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr.,
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 47.43(a). at 8-361 to -64 (1986)); see also

Oelrich v. Schlagels, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 430,433 (Minn. 1988) (noting that payment may take many
forms).
145. 645 N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div. 1996).

146. IL at 472. See also Betts v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 271 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Mich. 1978)
in the form of training and
(stating that the fact that the student teacher's payment "%,,-s
qualification for a professional goal does not disqualify [him] from the designation of employce");

Walls, 568 So. 2d at 718 (holding that training received as a student nurse is sufficient to qualify as
an advantage to constitute a "'wage"); Olsson v. Nyack Hosp., 598 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (App. Div.
1993) (noting that "training is a thing of value and the equivalent of wages").
147. 58 A.2d 615 (NJ. Ct. C.P. 1948).
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compensation."' 48 Most scholarship student athletes are also
compensated in the same exact manner. Student athletes usually obtain

room and board, as well as tuition and books,
in exchange for
49

participating in their school's athletic program.'
Besides those previously mentioned, there are other groups of
students that have been held to be employees. Students serving as
resident coordinators and resident advisors have been held to be
employees of their universities." In Marshall v. Marist College,"' each
student serving as a resident coordinator or resident advisor received a

stipend from his or her school that was directly credited against their
tuition, room, and board."2 Effectively, this stipend worked the same
way as a student athlete's scholarship. In addition, similar to student
athletes, the daily lives of the resident coordinators and resident advisors
were highly regulated. They were given certain duties to perform, which

occupied approximately twenty-five to fifty hours a week. 3
The court in Marshall also ruled that the resident coordinators and

resident advisors were employees because their functions primarily
benefited the college."' Their work promoted good student morale,
which is essential to the harmonious operation of the school.' Similarly,
the activities of student athletes also tend to advance good student
morale, along with other benefits. "[M]ajor collegiate athletic programs
... provide an opportunity for student-athletes to obtain an education
which might otherwise be unavailable to them, while at the same time
boosting school morale and providing needed revenues.' 5 6

148. l at 617; see also Krause v. Trs. of Hamline Univ., 68 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Minn. 1955)
(holding that student nurses who perform services and are furnished board and room are
employees); Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hosp., 140 N.E. 694, 695 (N.Y. 1923) (stating that "It]he fact
that internes [sic] ... receive no money for their services, but only lodging, board, and uniforms,
does not defeat their right to an award").
149. See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 437 N.E.2d 78, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
150. See Marshall v. Marist Coll., 15 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1328, 1330 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). In Marshall, the students were held to be employees within the meaning of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. See id. at 1331.
151. 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
152. See id. at 1329-30.
153. See id. at 1330. For example, their duties included such responsibilities as the supervision
of the dormitory and its students, maintaining discipline in the dormitory, and holding and attending
regular meetings. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Kneeland v.
NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1076, 1082-83 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
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In addition, there is the case of Clevidence v Portland School
District#12"' In Clevidence, a fourth-grader, who put away tables in the
cafeteria in exchange for receiving free lunch, was considered an
employee of his school under workers' compensation laws.' 3 The court
noted that the legality of the child's employment, being only a minor,
made no difference regarding his rights to the benefits of the workers'
compensation system. 5 Therefore, if a minor child in elementary school
can be considered an employee of his school because he receives a free
lunch, surely a student athlete who receives a free education, along with
free room and board, should also be considered an employee of his or
her university.
Besides holding that students may be employees of their schools,
courts "have recognized that a person may occupy the dual status of an
employee and student with respect to an activity."'" In Hallal v.RDV
Sports, Inc., 6 ' the plaintiff participated in a sports internship program in
order for him to satisfy the requirements necessary to earn his college
degree.'6" Although he was only involved in the program for academic
reasons, the court held that he was still considered an employee.'
Student athletes seem to have this same hybrid status of an employee
and student. Many students participate in athletics as a means of
attaining an education that they would otherwise not be able to afford."
D. Public Policy
The current alternatives, or the lack of alternatives as it may be, to
workers' compensation that are available to student athletes are
inadequate. "At most schools, scholarship athletes are covered for
athletics-related injuries during the term of their scholarship, but have no
long-term benefits."'6 5 The recent catastrophic injury insurance plan of
the NCAA does not cover the wide array of injuries that are prevalent in
college athletics.'6 It only "provides coverage for life-threatening
157. 866 P.2d 492 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
at 492-93.
158. See id.

at 493.
159. See id.
160. Evanson v. Univ. of Haw., 483 P.2d 187, 190 (law. 1971); see also Van Horn v. Indus.
Accident Cornm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 173 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).

161. 682 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
162. See iL at 1237.

163. See ti
164. See Kneeland v. NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1076, 1082-83 (W.D. Tem. 1986); Barny v.Tirn,
Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1116-17 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
165. Topol, supranote 6.
166. See Woodbum, supranote 15, at 615.
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injuries such as paralysis."'67 Additionally, the plan does not require a
member college or university of the NCAA to subscribe to the plan or to
any alternative insurance coverage."
Likewise, a disability insurance coverage plan that is available only
"to 'exceptional student-athletes"' is insufficient.'9 This plan only
provides for those athletes with future star potential in the three major
sports of football, basketball, and baseball. 7 ° The vast majority of other
athletes are virtually ignored.' In addition, the NCAA allows "medical
hardship" cases in which universities may continue to provide athletic
scholarships to those student athletes who are physically unable to
perform anymore because of an injury.' Although this helps to allow
athletes to complete their education, it does not protect them against a
significant loss of future earning power.'
Another possible course of recovery is through the tort system.' 74
However, an injured student athlete has very difficult obstacles to
overcome due to the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. '7 In order to prevail, it is likely that a student athlete
needs to show either gross negligence or intent to harm on behalf of the
university.'76 A final alternative for the student athlete is that he or she
can always purchase his or her own insurance or family insurance;
however, it is often at an unreasonable and expensive price.'" "Given the
vast amount of revenue which universities earn through athletic
programs, it seems highly inequitable to force a scholarship-athlete to
pay for their own insurance or otherwise face the risk of being left
without any means of compensation."'7
Therefore, the most fair and just way to protect student athletes
from possible athletic injury would be to hold them as employees of
their universities in order to make workers' compensation available to
them. Workers' compensation would allow an injured student athlete to7
seek an award that would extend beyond his school career. 1
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Id. at 615 n.29.
See id. at 615.
See id.
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See id.
See Whitmore, supra note 10, at 797.
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Furthermore, "allowing scholarship athletes to recover workers'
compensation would benefit the university by affording it protection
from potentially high adverse judgments.""' In 1984, the University of
Nebraska estimated that workers' compensation premiums for student
athletes would only cost approximately $55,000 a year.'8' This is a small
price for universities to pay considering the amount of money, as well as
other assets, that student athletes raise for them each year. In addition,
the total amount to be paid would be even less than expected because not
every school gives scholarships and not all student athletes receive
scholarships.'2
Concluding that student athletes qualify as employees would be a
step in the right direction for college sports. In the past, the typical
college athlete has usually been "placed in an unequal bargaining
position,"'' 3 with "no voice or participation in the formulation or
interpretation of [the] rules and regulations governing his scholarship."'
This seems quite unfair since his conduct is controlled on and off the
playing field.' The availability of workers' compensation would
provide each scholarship student athlete with at least some comfort that
he or she would be compensated in the case of an injury.
One reason that some may object to classifying student athletes as
employees of their universities is its effect on the amateurism of college
athletics."6 However, it has been suggested that the amateurism of
college athletics is really just a myth.' Rarely do college teams face one
another believing that their opponents have satisfied the eligibility
requirements." Approximately thirty percent of schools affiliated with
the NCAA engage in dishonest activities every year.' Furthermore,
"[flifty-seven percent of the 106 NCAA Division I-A football members
alone were either censured, sanctioned or put on probation at least once
during the 1980's."'" Major college sports are really just a farm system
for the professional leagues' 9
180.
181.
182.
183.

Roberts, supranote 5, at 1352.
See Elizondo, supra note 6.
Division Ell schools do not give athletic scholarships. See Topol, supra note 6.
Gulf S. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553,558 (Ala. 1979).
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186. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 1353.

187. See Walters v. Fullwood, 675 F. Supp. 155, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
188. See id.
189. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 1353.
190. Id at 1353-54.

191. See Fortay v. Univ. of Miami, No. CIV.A.93-3443, 1994 WL 62319. at *I JD.NJ. Feb.
17,1994).
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In addition, even if amateurism really does exist and needs to be
protected, holding student athletes as employees of their universities for
workers' compensation purposes does not affect the status of college
athletes.
[S]tudent-athletes are [only] ineligible to participate in a sport if they
do any one of the following:
[(1)]-they contract to be represented by an agent in the marketing
of the individual's athletic ability or reputation in that sport.
[(2)]-they take any pay for participation in that sport including
the promise of pay when such pay was to be received following
completion of the student-athlete's intercollegiate athletic career.
[(3)]-they receive financial assistance other than that
administered by their schools except where the assistance comes
from the athletes' family or was awarded on a basis having no
relationship to athletic ability.92
Allowing student athletes to be able to receive workers' compensation
does not interfere with any of the above eligibility requirements.
In fact, entitling student athletes to workers' compensation benefits
is likely to protect their status as amateurs. Student athletes would no
longer feel the need to take money from agents or those affiliated with
the university because of a fear of injuring themselves and ruining their
chances at a professional sports career. Many of them would also be less
encouraged to leave school early in order to avoid an injury that could
hinder their chances at a professional sports career. Instead, under
workers' compensation laws, they would be able to receive a monetary
award from an injury that has, unfortunately, led to the end of their
athletic careers.
Another reason that there may be objections to an employee status
for student athletes in the workers' compensation context is the fear that
a door may then be opened "for other employment claims, such as
salaries, benefits, and the right to form unions."' 93 However, being
entitled to workers' compensation would not require application of any
other employment claims, such as those under the National Labor
Relations Act." In reference to the National Labor Relations Act,
"certain classes of employees may be expressly excluded from coverage
under the Act by the National Labor Relations Board.""' Those
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United States v. waiters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1437-38 (N.D. Il. 1989).
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employees that may be expressly excluded can include scholarship
athletes.96

Likewise, some may worry that the applicability of workers'
compensation could spread to non-athletic scholarship students, such as

musicians or merit scholars.' 7 However, due to the non-athletic activities
of these students, the cost of workers' compensation premiums for them
would probably be very inexpensive.'
"Moreover, in light of the
millions of dollars athletes bring to universities each year, workers'

compensation for all scholarship students would be economically
feasible and fair."'"
V. CONCLUSION

Courts must now concede that college athletics is more than just
friendly competition between schools. Universities have placed a great
deal of importance on their athletic teams in an effort to increase revenue

and reputation."' Therefore, for all essential purposes, college athletics
qualifies as a sizeable business.2'
Student athletes are no longer solely looked upon as students.

Additionally, they are employees of their universities. The amount of
proof available to show that an employment relationship exists between
student athletes and colleges is substantial. Many of the prior cases

ruling against the student athlete as an employee lack adequate
reasoning.' Furthermore, the various tests that the courts apply, to look

for an employment relationship, all lead to the conclusion that such a
relationship exists.0' There is also a considerable amount of public
policy in favor of the employee classification.2'

196. See id.
197. See id at 1354.
198. See id
199. L
200. See KNIGHT REPORT, supranote 113, at 4-5.
201. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984) (recognizing that NCAA teleision
contracts have a commercial nature); see also Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136. 1149 (5th Cir.
1977) (holding that the NCAA, wvith its multi-million dollar annual budget, is engaged in a business
venture and is not entitled to a complete exemption from anti-trust regulation on the ground that its
activities are educational and carried on for the benefit of amateurism); Gaines v. NCAA. 746
F. Supp. 738, 744 (MLD. Tenn. 1990) (agreeing %viththe Hennessey decision that the NCAA is
involved in a business venture). "[lintercollegiate athletics in its management is clearly businzss,
and big business at that" Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1150.
202. See supranotes 75-90 and accompanying text.
203. See supraPart IV.B.
204. See supraPart 1V.D.
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Finally, it is unjust and unfair to allow student athletes to take part

in an employment relationship without having the protection that should
be bestowed on all employees. If student athletes must submit
themselves to the total control of their coaches and their universities," '
they, in return, should be able to expect that the universities will provide

them with an appropriate form of compensation should they injure
themselves. This compensation should be obtainable in the form of
workers' compensation.
Jason Gurdus*

205. See supranotes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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